

Dodd Hits U. S. 'Retreats' In Test-Ban Proposals

Sen. Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) claims the Administration has conceded that its proposed terms for a nuclear test-ban treaty with Soviet Russia "do not give us a guarantee against cheating."

Dodd argues his point in a letter to The Washington Post today challenging the Administration's reasons for its current test-ban position. These reasons were set forth in a letter to The Washington Post on Monday sent by Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Fisher's letter had been a reply to a previous letter sent to The Washington Post by Dodd and published on March 1.

Dodd states that the U. S. has "made so many retreats and concessions to the Soviets in five years of negotiations that our proposed system of monitoring stations and on-site inspections within the Soviet Union is now a hollow shell."

Dodd challenges Fisher for what he claims is a failure to give "solid assurance that the Soviets cannot continue tests and develop new weapons" while the United States would be immobilized by a treaty.

"On the contrary," Dodd says, "he (Fisher) confirms my misgivings. He affirms that the proposed treaty does involve the risk of undetected cheating. He affirms that

there is only a 'probability' that a whole series of tests could be detected, not a certainty, but a probability, which means that there is a possibility that a whole series of tests could not be detected."

It is for these reasons, in Dodd's view, that the Administration concedes its treaty proposals are inadequate to deter or to catch a cheater, namely the Soviets.

Dodd dismisses the argument that the risks of not signing a treaty are greater

Text of Sen. Dodd's letter. Page A26.

Administration has no intention of signing a nuclear test ban agreement that would imperil U. S. security, President says. Page A18.

American proposals for NATO nuclear force were in response to European suggestions to create one, President says. Page A17.

than the acknowledged risks of signing it.

His argument is irrelevant, Dodd maintains, because the proposed treaty would not prevent all testing by the Soviets or prevent the spread of nuclear arms to other nations—the two major fears of what continued testing could bring.

In his letter, the Connecticut Senator also challenges several other points made by Fisher.

Dodd also notes, as he has in the past, that through hidden tests the Soviets could develop decisive weapons, such as the so-called neutron bomb and an anti-missile warhead, which in Dodd's view could so alter the balance of power as to present the U. S. with a choice "between surrender and all-out nuclear war."

This frequently repeated Dodd view has just as often been challenged by some scientists and Administration officials who hold a contrary view.

Dodd concludes that because the treaty "does not of a certainty prevent continued Soviet nuclear development," the U. S. must place its trust in its own continued nuclear weapons development program.